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Abstract
Models in behavioural finance have been developed to explain apparent anomalies in stock returns. A
property common to a number of these models is that agents under react in the short run to public signals
about future earnings. This contrasts sharply with the popular informal belief that stock prices overreact
to news. A behavioural model also predicts returns reversals over longer horizons. We examine stock
returns following profit warnings to test which, if any, of these hypotheses stands up to scrutiny on a
new data set which was generated by  a  process  which  corresponds  closely  to  that  assumed  in  the
behavioural models.
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1. Introduction
It  is  widely  agreed  that  cross-section  stock  returns  can  be  forecast  from  public
information. Variables like lagged returns, size of the company, dividend yield, price
earnings ratio, and the ratio of the book to the market value of the company have all
been shown to forecast excess returns (for a survey see Fama, 1998). Of these variables,
the most difficult to explain in an efficient market is the role of lagged returns, where the
evidence  is  that  high  frequency  returns  (one  month  or  less)  are  positively
autocorrelated. This is known as the momentum effect (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).
However low frequency returns (one year or more) tend to be negatively autocorrelated
(DeBondt  and  Thaler,  1985).  For  example  Fama  and  French  (1996)  show  that  a
portfolio constructed by buying stocks which were losers in the five years up to one
year before it is formed and going short in winners over that same period is profitable.
However buying winners over the last 12 months and going short in losers over the last
12 months is also profitable. It appears that short term momentum co-exists with long
run reversals in returns.
Price scaled accounting variables may be  interpreted  as  proxies  for  risk  factors  not
captured by  the  variables  specified  in  the  standard  models of  asset  pricing. Risky
companies will ceteris paribus have a low price relative to any accounting measure of
fundamental value. Therefore the forecasting power of price scaled accounting variables
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may be not a profit opportunity but rather reflect risk which has not been captured by
the standard adjustments used to calculate excess returns, such as the CAPM (Berk,
1996).  However,  as  Fama  (1998)  acknowledges,  it  is  hard  to  find  a  risk  proxy
interpretation for the patterns of serial correlation found in the returns data.
It is therefore a particularly important and interesting challenge for behavioural finance
to develop a theoretical explanation for both short term momentum and long run return
reversals. Theoretical work in this relatively new area involves building models which
are alternatives to the fully rational efficient markets model. The general approach is to
construct quasi rational models which are grounded on sound psychological evidence on
how individuals actually behave.
Daniel et al. (1998) employ one of the most enduring results from the psychological
literature, which is that individuals overestimate their own ability in a wide variety of
situations.  This  assumption  is  used  in  an  otherwise  rational  framework  to  model
learning  and  to  derive implications  for  stock  returns  following  the  arrival  of  new
information. Agents are assumed to use a Bayesian learning model but to give too little
weight to public signals, and too much to their prior beliefs and/or private signals. This
implies an initial under reaction to public signals. When the realisation of the random
variable is finally observed, there will then be a “surprise”, and hence excess returns that
are of the same sign as the initial reaction. In this way, momentum will appear in returns
data sets which span a public announcement.
Barberis et  al.  (1998)  build  on  evidence  of  two  judgement  biases  from  cognitive
psychology: a) Individuals give too much weight to recent patterns in the data and too
little to the underlying population from which the data is drawn; b) individuals are slow
to update their models in response to new information. Barberis et al. (1998) capture
these two biases in a model where it is assumed that earnings follow a random walk
with zero drift, but investors wrongly believe there are two regimes. One regime is mean
reverting and the other is a time trend. In order to see how this may explain the data,
suppose agents initially believe they are in the mean reverting regime. Stock prices will
initially  under  react  to  new  information, since agents believe  earnings  to  be  mean
reverting. However since they are actually a random walk agents will in time receive a
sequence of earnings announcements which all have the same sign of deviation from the
expectation  of  the  mean reverting  model. They  then  switch  beliefs to  the  trended
earnings  model  and  extrapolate  the  trend  they  believe  they  have  identified.  This
produces returns of the same sign as the initial under reaction, resulting in the observed
momentum. Eventually the error of believing in the trended model is exposed and there
is then a reversal of long term returns.
The objective of this paper is to test these models by tracing returns following a profit
warning. Both models imply negative returns in the months following a profit warning.
This is a context which conforms closely to the assumptions  of  the  overconfidence
model of Daniel et al. (1998). Profit warnings are a  public  signal  about  an  earnings
realisation which will follow, usually within six months. It is therefore over this horizon
that this model implies momentum should be detected.- 3 -
The model of Barberis et al. (1998) also implies agents will initially under react to the
warning, because in their model agents cling to the mean reverting beliefs. However as
more bad news accumulates over the following months they switch to the (negative)
time  trend  model for  earnings,  resulting in  negative  returns  and  hence  momentum.
However eventually they realise they were mistaken to extrapolate the downward trend
and  prices  rebound  strongly.  In  this  way  Barberis  et  al.  (1998)  has  the  further
implication that earnings in the year after the bad news year, when the warning was
issued, will on average be a positive surprise for agents who had extrapolated from the
bad news year using a declining time trend. We should then expect positive returns as
agents realise they were wrong to extrapolate a downward earnings trend.
It is surprising that returns following profit warnings have not been examined already in
the literature, given the intensive study of returns following an earnings announcement
on both US and UK data. Even apart from the fact that they conform closely to the
over confidence model, profit warnings merit study simply on the grounds of the size of
returns response they engender. They result in a much larger one day price response, on
average  minus  16%,  than  earnings  announcements,  where  80%  of  earnings
announcements result in  an  absolute  returns  response  of  less  than  5%  on  the  day
(Kandel and Pearson, 1995). One of the problems in measuring excess returns is that
there is no universally agreed  model of  asset  pricing. Given  the  volatility  of  stock
returns it is very useful to have a strong signal, so that results may be robust with
respect to the method used to calculate excess returns.
It is interesting to observe that formal models, based on evidence from psychology, give
rise to the exactly opposite prediction to the informal view that markets over react to
news in the short run. This latter view seemed to many observers to be a natural way to
explain the evidence of excess volatility in financial markets, but it was not supported
by formal reasoning. The informal overreaction story and the  quasi  rational learning
models have diametrically opposed predictions about the sign of excess returns in the
one to six months following a profits warning.
In the following section we describe the data and in section 3 we examine the evidence
for  the  momentum  hypothesis.  Section  4  investigates  the  long-run  returns  data
following profit warnings and section 5 studies the history of returns of stocks prior to
the profit warning. Finally section 6 concludes.
2. Profit Warnings and Returns Data
Profit warnings are the discretionary disclosure of bad news by  companies  prior  to
earnings announcements. They may take the form of a specific revised earnings forecast
or may be a qualitative statement that simply states, or implies, that earnings will be
significantly  less  than  current  brokers’  expectations.  Approximately  half  of  all
companies whose earnings announcements are going to be “bad news” warn in advance
(Kasznik and Lev 1995).- 4 -
Why  companies  warn  is  an  interesting  question  which  has  received  considerable
attention. It has been argued that investors punish companies for not warning them, lose
confidence in management that does not communicate, and that companies who do not
communicate news in a timely way could be exposed to legal action, see for example
Libby  and  Tan  (1999).  However  Shin  (2001)  develops  a  model  of  information
transmission and obtains the result that companies will not warn. Clearly then there are
forces working for and against issuing profit warnings so we should not be surprised
that only a subset of firms warn.
The source of data on profit  warnings is  the  news  section  of  Bloomberg  database.
Companies were identified using the code words “warn” and “UK”, to select  profit
warnings from United Kingdom only. This data is only available since August 1997.
This classification produced nearly 2800 news items in the period August 12
th, 1997 to
December 31
st 1999. This is the latest date we collect profits warning data since we
want to be able to trace returns for two years from the date of the warning and at the
time  of  writing we  have data  on  returns  up  to  December  31
st  2001.  Fama (1998)
suggests that many reported anomalies may be the product of extensive data mining. It
therefore may be worth noting that in this paper these two constraints meant that no
discretion was possible in the choice of the data set.
We manually inspected the text of each of the statements picked up by the code word
search. Many statements turned out to be trading updates which had no specific profit
implications, and others merely confirmed current analyst expectations or reported good
news. Companies were selected for our sample when we confirmed that the statement
was unambiguously bad news. This statement might be either a qualitative statement
that the earnings news would be disappointing relative to expectations or  a  specific
revised forecast of earnings. This left 455 companies that unambiguously reported bad
news.
Returns data was taken from Datastream. Out of 455 companies which issued negative
warnings 450 survived for six full months after the warning. Of those that died within
six months, three were reported by Datastream to have been liquidated and two merged
or were taken over. In the case of firms which went into liquidation we assumed all
shareholder value was lost. In the case of delisting because of merger or takeover we
assumed the value of the shareholders funds on the last trading day were invested in the
FTSE All Share Index for the remainder of the period after the day of delisting.
Excess  returns  are calculated  in  the  evidence  for  momentum  as,  for  example,  the
difference between the returns on a portfolio which consists of the 10% best performing
stocks over the previous three months and a portfolio which consists of the 10% worst
performing stocks over the previous three months. This corresponds to the experience
of an investor who goes long in the top 10% portfolio and shorts the  bottom  10%
portfolio. We apply the same principle here, calculating excess returns as the difference
between the returns of a  stock which has issued a profit warning and the FTSE all share
index.- 5 -
  ERit = Rit - Rmt ,
 
where ERit is the excess return of stock i on day t, Rmt is the return of stock i on day t
and Rmt is the return on the FTSE all share index on day i.
In principle one would like to adjust excess returns for the difference between the risk
of the firms which have issued warnings and the risk of the average firm in the FTSE all
share  index.  However  since  the  seminal  paper  of  Fama  and  French    (1992)  has
discredited the use of the CAPM model there is no widely agreed model of asset pricing
to apply. Fama (1998) observes that use of an incorrect model to adjust returns can lead
to  substantial  biases  in  measurement  of  multi-period  returns.  We  observe  that
companies which have recently issued warnings are surely more risky than the average
so that when excess returns are calculated relative to the all share index we can be almost
sure of the sign of any measurement error. It will be seen below that this is useful in
interpreting the significance of our results.





Compounding returns would correspond to the actual experience of an investor who
bought and held the stocks. However Fama (1998) argues that inferences about long
term returns should be based on averages, or sums, of short horizon returns. He argues
that compound returns should not be used because they also compound any error in
measuring excess returns. This exacerbates any biases in estimates of long run excess
returns which result from the use of the wrong model to measure excess returns. We
therefore report cumulated returns.
3. Evidence of Momentum
In tables 1 and 2 and figure 1, we see results for market adjusted returns. On the day of
the warning the average company loses 16.6% of its value. In the 5 days immediately
after the warning there is, on average, no sign of any further price reaction. As explained
earlier,  subsequent  excess  returns  accrue  as  the  market  comes  to  realise  the  true
situation, to which it initially under reacted. Profit warnings are never issued within
days  of  the  final results  and  we  should  not  be  surprised  that  there  is  no  further
information within days of the warning.
The results are a significant rejection of the hypothesis that markets over react in the
short term. Over the next 6 months, a window that will normally include the actual
earnings announcement, cumulated average excess returns are –3.9% with a ‘t’ statistic
for a test of the null hypothesis that excess returns are zero equal to –1.75 (Table 1).
Excess returns of almost 8% per annum are on the same scale as some of the larger
anomalies surveyed in Fama (1998). Although this is of marginal statistical significance- 6 -
note that in calculating excess returns relative to the all share index we are implicitly
assuming that expected returns, and hence risk,  for  these  stocks  which  have issued
profit warnings is the same as for the average in the market. However companies which
have issued profit warnings are almost surely more risky than the average. For example
their gearing will certainly have increased so the sensitivity of equity returns to new
information about shocks to earnings will have increased. Thus we would argue that the
benchmark expected return will be greater than our measure. This implies that the excess
returns of firms which have issued profits warnings will be even more negative than we
calculated above.
Table 1
Excess Returns, “Market Adjusted”
Day 0 1 2 3 4 5
Excess Return -16.65% -0.14% 0.10% -0.04% -0.09% 0.09%
St. Deviation 13.54% 7.24% 4.30% 3.77% 3.41% 4.41%
T Stat -26.233 -0.403 0.478 -0.252 -0.532 0.450
t = 0 , day of the profit warning
H0 : Excess return in day t <> from 0
Table 2
Cumulated Excess Returns, “Market Adjusted”
  - 6 Months 1 Month 3 Months 6 Months
Mean CERt -23.1% -0.4% -1.0% -3.9%
St. Deviation 56.6% 17.8% 31.2% 48.0%
T Stat. -8.711 -0.498 -0.653 -1.745
-6 Months: From t1=-130 to t2=-1 trading days
1 Month: From t1= 1 to t2= 22 trading days
3 Months: From t1= 1 to t2= 65 trading days
6 Months: From t1= 1 to t2= 130 trading days- 7 -
Figure 1
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4. Evidence of long run returns reversal
In the six to twelve months after the warning, by which time the typical firm will have
made  its  earnings  announcement,  stock  prices  drift,  with  small  positive  returns.
However it is after approximately a year, 260 trading days, that  the  striking return
reversal predicted by the Barberis et al. model is observed.  This is approximately the
time the reversal might be expected under their model, since 12 months after the warning
takes the market to the point where signals about the subsequent full year’s earnings
might be expected to start to arrive.  The market comes to realise that, for the typical
stock, last year’s fall in earnings should not have been extrapolated, and hence positive
returns follow. Over the 12-24 months after the warning cumulated daily excess returns
are approximately  23%  relative  to  the  market  (Figure  2  and  table  3).  Of  course
compounding daily returns to obtain the buy and hold  excess  return  of  an  investor
yields an even larger percentage figure. We have argued above that these companies are
surely more risky and therefore the excess returns calculated here are overestimated.
However it seems implausible that risk adjustment can explain such large excess returns.- 8 -
Figure 2
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Cumulated Excess Returns, “Market Adjusted”
  1 Year 2 Years 6 M - 2 years 1 - 2 years
Mean CERt -0.7% 21.4% 25.7% 22.4%
St. Deviation 67.4% 114.1% 112.0% 103.4%
T Stat. -0.216 4.001 4.889 4.625
1 Year: From t1= 1 to t2= 260 trading days
2 Years: From t1= 1 to t2= 520 trading days
6 M – 2 Years:From t1= 130 to t2= 260 trading days
1 – 2 Years: From t1= 260 to t2= 520 trading days
5. Returns Prior to Profit Warnings
In Figure 3 we trace returns in the months before a warning. In terms of a “life cycle” of
stock pricing it may be of interest to look at how far ahead the market started to get an
indication of a bad earnings result to come. This looks like approximately two years
before the warning. It is also interesting to see how much on average companies’ stock
prices fell since that time. The average daily rate over 650 days before the warning to
one day before is –0.08%. Compounding  this  gives  a  loss  in  value for  the  average
company of 41% until one day before the warning. By the time, companies reach their
low point six months after the warning they have lost on average 51% of their value
since two years before the warning.- 9 -
Figure 3
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Although  these  results  relating  to  returns  prior  to  warnings may  be  of  interest  as
descriptive statistics they cannot in principle offer evidence for or against the efficient
markets hypothesis. Whilst the pattern in these returns is  certainly  consistent  with
momentum it is also entirely consistent with a rational expectations model of learning
with noisy private signals about future earnings. We have conditioned the selection of
this sample on the retrospective criterion that the firms finally delivered a bad earnings
outcome  (they  never  warn  unless  the  outcome  is  actually  bad).  On  this  rational
expectations interpretation there should be a universe of companies which also received
“bad “ signals and hence experienced negative returns of a cumulative –53% relative to
the market, but subsequently turned out not to have a bad earnings realisation, so that
their returns bounced back.
Although markets had been gradually learning that it was increasingly likely that these
companies would deliver a bad earnings outcome there is evidence of insider trading in
the two days immediately before the warning (see table  4).  On  average  stocks  lose
approximately 0.3% percent of their value in each of the two days before the warning,
against average  daily  returns  of  –0.18%  over  the  previous  six  months.  These  are
statistically significantly lower returns than daily returns over the previous six months.
We can therefore reject the hypothesis that warnings are unanticipated.- 10 -
Table 4
Excess Return compared with previous 6 months
average daily return, “Market Adjusted”
Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
Excess Return -0.08% -0.10%0.15%-0.34%-0.32%-16.47%
St. Deviation 2.48% 3.12%2.91% 3.39% 3.07% 13.49%
T Stat -0.710 -0.714 1.134 -2.137 -2.205 -26.049
H0 : Excess return in day t <> from the  average
daily excess return of the six months before the day
of warning
6. Conclusions
Fama (1998) has criticised the behavioural models we have tested here on the grounds
that they do well on the anomalies which they were specifically designed to explain.
Here we have subjected them to an “out of sample” test on data that was not available
when they were developed. Both models imply short term momentum following new
public information. This is exactly what we have reported above for the case of profit
warnings. We also found strong evidence of long term reversals, following  warnings,
over the horizon which one would expect from the model of Barberis et al. Surveying
the evidence on anomalies, Fama (1998) argued that all are fragile with respect to the
method used to calculate excess returns. To this one could add that the size of many
anomalies is such  that,  once a  realistic value for  transactions  costs  is  allowed, the
anomaly cannot be profitably exploited. We would argue that the scale of the evidence
on returns reported in this paper is robust evidence against the efficient markets model
in general and consistent with specific alternatives proposed in behavioural finance.
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